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Future quantum computers are likely to be expensive and affordable outright by few, motivating
client/server models for outsourced computation. However, the applications for quantum comput-
ing will often involve sensitive data, and the client would like to keep her data secret, both from
eavesdroppers and the server itself. Homomorphic encryption is an approach for encrypted, out-
sourced quantum computation, where the client’s data remains secret, even during execution of the
computation. We present a scheme for the homomorphic encryption of arbitrary quantum states
of light with no more than a fixed number of photons, under the evolution of both passive and
adaptive linear optics, the latter of which is universal for quantum computation. The scheme uses
random coherent displacements in phase-space to obfuscate client data. In the limit of large coher-
ent displacements, the protocol exhibits asymptotically perfect information-theoretic secrecy. The
experimental requirements are modest, and easily implementable using present-day technology.
In the upcoming quantum era, it is to be expected that
client/server models for quantum computing will emerge,
owing to the high expected cost of quantum hardware.
This necessitates the ability for a client (Alice), possess-
ing data she wants processed, to outsource the computa-
tion to a host (Bob), who possesses the costly quantum
computer. In such a model, security will be a major con-
cern. The types of applications to which quantum com-
puting will initially be most relevant will contain sensitive
data, whether it be strategically important information,
or valuable intellectual property, or confidential personal
information. This raises the important question of how
Alice can outsource computation of her data such that
no adversary Eve, or even the server Bob, can read her
data – she trusts no one!
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic protocol
that achieves this objective. Alice sends encrypted data
to Bob, who processes it in encrypted form, before return-
ing it to Alice. The essential feature is that computing the
data does not require first decrypting it – it remains en-
crypted throughout the computation, ensuring that even
if Bob is compromised, Alice retains integrity of her data.
Classical homomorphic encryption has only been de-
scribed very recently [1–3], and a number of results for
homomorphic quantum computation have been described
[4–11]. In the case of universal quantum computation,
such protocols require a degree of interaction between
Alice and Bob. However, it was shown in [4] that un-
der certain restricted, non-universal models for quan-
tum computation, homomorphic encryption may be im-
plemented passively, without any client/server interac-
tion, and requiring only separable, non-entangling encod-
ing/decoding operations. In that protocol, in which sin-
gle photons encode data, random polarisation rotations
on Alice’s input photonic state obfuscate data from Bob.
And in [8], a similar protocol was presented using phase-
key encoding, whereby random rotations in phase-space
obfuscate Alice’s data, encoded into coherent states.
These two protocols are limited in their security by
the fact that the rotations in phase-/polarisation-space
are correlated across all inputs, thereby limiting the en-
tropy of the encoded input states, and hence its security.
For example, with m optical modes, polarisation-key en-
coding is only able to hide O(log(m)) bits of information,
falling far short of our utopian ideal of perfect informa-
tion theoretic security (i.e hiding allm bits of information
in the case of 0 or 1 photons per mode).
The polarisation- and phase-key homomorphic encryp-
tion techniques are specific examples of a more gen-
eral framework for encryption, whereby the encoding
and decoding operations commute with the computation,
thereby mitigating the need for elaborate interactive pro-
tocols.
Here we consider an alternate technique that super-
sedes both polarisation- and phase-key encoding – dis-
placement key encoding, whereby random coherent dis-
placements obfuscate optically-encoded quantum infor-
mation. This idea has been recently explored by Mar-
shall et al. [12], where it was argued heuristically why
the scheme might be secure. Based on experimental data
generated, Marshall et al. numerically showed that the
mutual information between the encrypted and the un-
encrypted data can be made small as the variance of the
random displacements increases. This encouraging evi-
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2dence suggests that a displacement key encoding might
be offer perfect security in the asymptotic limit. However,
obtaining analytical bounds to quantify the security of
the scheme has been recognized to be a challenging is-
sue, yet to be solved.
In this paper, we rigorously obtain explicit bounds
on the security of using a displacement key encoding,
thereby confirming the intuition of Ref. [12]. Moreover,
the displacement key encoding improves on the earlier
polarisation- and phase-key techniques in two important
respects. First, we demonstrate that by choosing the
encoding displacement operators to be independent on
each optical mode and to follow a Gaussian distribution
with an increasing variance, any pair of encoded code-
words will become increasingly close in trace-distance
and thereby increasingly indistinguishable. Our encod-
ing scheme thereby exhibits information-theoretic secu-
rity [13]. We also remark that the trace-distance metric
we use is preferable to the mutual information used in
Ref. [12], because the trace distance directly quantifies
the indistinguishability of quantum states while the mu-
tual information does not. Second, our technique is ap-
plicable to linear optics computations acting on arbitrary
quantum states of light with no more than a fixed num-
ber of photons. This is far more general than polarisation-
key encoding, which applies to single-photon input states,
or phase-key encoding, which applies to input coherent
states.
Commutative homomorphic encryption of passive lin-
ear optics — A linear optics network, comprising only
beamsplitters and phase-shifters, implements a photon-
number-preserving unitary map on the photonic creation
operators,
Uˆ aˆ†i Uˆ
† →
m∑
j=1
Ui,j aˆ
†
j , (1)
where aˆ†i is the creation operator for the ith mode, there
are m optical modes, and U is an SU(m) matrix charac-
terising the linear optics network.
Bob possesses both the hardware and software for im-
plementing the computation (Uˆ), which Alice would like
applied to her input state (|ψ〉in), yielding the computed
output state (|ψ〉out = Uˆ |ψ〉in).
Before sending her input state to Bob, Alice, who has
limited quantum resources, wishes to encode her input
state using operations separable across all modes, sim-
ilarly for decoding, i.e we rule out entangling gates for
Alice. To achieve this, we require the commutation rela-
tion,
Uˆ
[
m⊗
i=1
Eˆi(k)
]
=
[
m⊗
i=1
Eˆ′i(k)
]
Uˆ , (2)
to hold, where Eˆi(k) (Eˆ
′
i(k)) is the encoding (decod-
ing) operation, with key k. Since Alice has limited clas-
sical computational power, we require that determining
and implementing the encoding/decoding operations be
given by a classically efficient bounded-error probabilistic
polynomial time (BPP) algorithm. The complexity class
BPP encompasses all efficient probabilistic algorithms
that can be run quickly on real modern machines [14].
The model is summarised in Fig. 1.
Alice
Bob
Alice
FIG. 1. General protocol for commuting homomorphic en-
cryption of optical states under linear optics evolution Uˆ ,
where Eˆi (Eˆ
′
i) are the encoding (decoding) operations, which
we require to be separable.
The most natural examples of schemes complying with
this model are ones where systems encoding quantum in-
formation comprise two subsystems: a primary one in
which the computation is taking place; and, a secondary
independent one, which does not directly couple with the
primary and is unaffected by the computational opera-
tions. This allows us to exploit the secondary subsystem
(e.g polarisation) to control the entropy of our codewords,
without affecting the computation in the primary subsys-
tem (e.g photon-number).
Displacement-key encoding — Phase-space displace-
ment operations satisfy the required commutation rela-
tion of Eq. (2). The displacement operation adds coher-
ent amplitude to an optical state, thereby translating it
in phase-space. This process is described by the unitary
displacement operator, given by,
Dˆ(α) = exp
[
αaˆ† − α∗aˆ] . (3)
Displacement operations are easily experimentally im-
plemented using a low-reflectivity beamsplitter and a co-
herent state (well approximated by a laser source), of the
form,
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉, (4)
(see Fig. 2). The displacement amplitude is directly pro-
portional to the coherent state amplitude and the beam-
splitter reflectivity. A special case of displaced states are
displaced vacuum states, which are identically coherent
states of the same amplitude, Dˆ(α)|0〉 = |α〉.
3FIG. 2. Experimental realisation of the displacement opera-
tor. A strong coherent state (|α〉) is incident on an extremely
low reflectivity (r) beamsplitter, where it is mixed with the
input state (ρˆin). The output state (ρˆout) is now given by the
input state, displaced by amplitude rα.
The commutation relation between displacement oper-
ators and linear optics evolution relates the output dis-
placement amplitudes ~β = (β1, . . . , βm) to the input dis-
placement amplitudes ~α = (α1, . . . , αm), and is given by
UˆDˆ(~α) = Dˆ(~β)Uˆ , (5)
where Dˆ(~β) =
⊗m
j=1 Dˆ(βj), Dˆ(~α) =
⊗m
j=1 Dˆ(βj), and
~β
relates to ~α according to the unitary map
~β = U · ~α. (6)
The computation required for Alice to determine her de-
coding operations from her encoding operations is simple
matrix multiplication, which is efficiently computable in
P, where P contains all decision problems that can be
solved by a deterministic Turing machine using a polyno-
mial amount of computation time [14]. Thus, our condi-
tion on the complexity of encoding/decoding is satisfied.
An input tensor product of displacement operations
with amplitudes ~α on multiple modes may be be reversed
by applying inverse displacement operations with ampli-
tudes ~β at the output, Dˆ(~β)† = Dˆ(−~β). Specifically,
Dˆ(−~β)UˆDˆ(~α) = Uˆ , (7)
allowing the computation, Uˆ |ψin〉, to be recovered from
the encoded computation, UˆDˆ(~α)|ψin〉, via application of
the inverse of the encoding operation.
Unlike phase-key or polarisation-key encoding, where
the encoding operations applied to each mode must be
identical for the encryption/decryption commutation re-
lation to hold, for displacements the amplitudes may be
chosen independently for each mode, while still preserv-
ing the desired commutation relation. Intuitively, one
would anticipate that the ability to choose keys inde-
pendently for each mode would improve security, since
the elimination of correlations between input encoding
operations allows the entropy of the encoded state to be
greatly increased, thereby making codewords less distin-
guishable.
We examine this protocol in the context of input data
comprising of arbitrary pure quantum states of light with
no more than n photons. In the photon-number basis this
implies that,
|ψin〉 =
n∑
j=0
λj |j〉, ρˆin = |ψin〉〈ψin|, (8)
where |j〉 = 1√
j!
(aˆ†)j |0〉 is a photon-number (Fock) state
and aˆ† is the photonic creation operator.
Security proof — We now present a security proof
for this encoding scheme in the limit of large coherent
displacements. Our proof employs a continuous-variable
(CV) representation for optical states. We omit some in-
termediate mathematical steps in the main text, delegat-
ing the complete step-by-step derivation to the appendix.
Photon-number (Fock) states are related to the x and
p quadrature CVs using Hermite functions. The Hermite
polynomials are defined as,
Hj(x) = (−1)nex2 d
j
dxj
e−x
2
, (9)
and the corresponding Hermite functions as,
ψj(x) = e
−x2/2 1√
2jj!
√
pi
Hj(x). (10)
These provide as with the direct relation between DV and
CV representations of optical states. Most importantly,
for Fock states we have,
|j〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
ψj(x)|x〉 dx, (11)
where x is a position eigenstate in phase-space. The po-
sition eigenstates form a complete basis, satisfying,
〈x1|x2〉 = δ(x1 − x2). (12)
Our input state from Eq. (8) can therefore be expressed
in the position basis as
ρˆin =
∑
0≤i,j≤n
λiλ
∗
j
∫
x1,x2∈R
ψi(x1)ψ
∗
j (x2)|x1〉〈x2| dx1dx2.
(13)
Let Alice’s encoding operation be represented by the
quantum process Eenc, which applies a random complex-
valued displacement, chosen from a normal distribution
with zero mean and standard deviation σ. Experimen-
tally, σ is bounded by the energy output of coherent laser
sources. An unknown encoding operation can be repre-
sented as a quantum process,
Eenc(ρˆ) =
∫
α∈C
µ(α)Dˆ(α)ρˆDˆ(α)†d2α, (14)
4where µ(α) = e
−|α|2/(2σ2)
2piσ2 is a Gaussian measure and
d2α = d(<(α))d(=(α)) indicates that the integral is per-
formed over the real and imaginary parts of α. Then our
encrypted state ρˆenc = Eenc(ρin) can be interpreted as a
weighted mixture over all possible displacement ampli-
tudes associated with the entire key-space. Displacing a
position eigenstate by α = u+ iv shifts its position by v
and appends a phase that depends on its position, u and
v. After performing the integral over the imaginary part
of the complex number α = u+ iv, we get
ρˆenc =
∑
0≤i,j≤n
λ∗i λj
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
e−u
2/(4σ2)
2
√
piσ2
ψi(x1)ψ
∗
j (x2)
× |x1 + u〉〈x2 + u| du dx1 dx2. (15)
The security of the scheme can be quantified using the
trace-distance between any pair of its encrypted inputs.
When the trace-distance between a pair of states in an
encryption scheme approaches zero, the resolution of this
pair of states as perceived by Eve or Bob vanishes. Such
a scheme is said to exhibit weak information-theoretic
security [13], and we proceed to show that our encryption
scheme indeed exhibits such a form of security.
To show that the trace-distance between almost arbi-
trary input states with no more than a fixed number
of photons approaches zero as the standard deviation
of the random displacements grows, we require detailed
information of every matrix element 〈a|ρˆenc|b〉. To get
a handle on 〈a|ρˆenc|b〉, it suffices to consider 〈a|ρˆi,j |b〉
where ρˆi,j = E(|i〉〈j|) because ρˆenc =
∑
0≤i,j≤n λ
∗
i λj ρˆi,j .
Since 〈a| and |b〉 can be both expressed in terms of
Hermite polynomials in the position basis, we find that
〈a|ρˆi,j |b〉 is just an integral of the product of four Her-
mite polynomials. To evaluate these integrals, we recall
that any Hermite polynomial Hj(x) can be expressed as
the coefficient of tj in the Gaussian generating function
e−x
2/2+2xt−t2e−x
2/2j!. Hence, 〈a|ρˆi,j |b〉may be evaluated
by writing all of the Hermite polynomials in terms of their
Gaussian generating functions, performing the Gaussian
integrals, and then reading off the respective coefficients.
In doing so, we find that when 〈a|ρˆi,j |b〉 is only non-zero
when b− a = j − i. In particular, we have
〈a|ρˆi,i|a〉 =
min(a,i)∑
i2=0
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2xa+i
1 + 2σ2
, (16)
and when k ≥ 1,
0 ≤ 〈a|ρˆi,i+k|a+ k〉 ≤
min(a,i)∑
i2=0
(
a+k
i2+k
)(
i+k
i2+k
)
y2i2+kxa+i+k
1 + 2σ2
,
(17)
where y = 12σ2 and x =
2σ2
1+2σ2 . Now let T denote the
difference between two encrypted inputs. By using the
decomposition T = D + O where D is diagonal in the
Fock basis, we will obtain an upper bound on the trace
norm of T . First we prove that the trace norm of D is
O(σ−2). To see this, note that
〈a|ρˆi+1,i+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi,i|a〉
=
−〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
xa+i+1
1 + 2σ2
∑
k=1,...,min{a,i}
(
a
k
)(
i
k − 1
)
y2k.
(18)
We can use this fact to show that ‖ρˆi+1,i+1−ρˆi,i‖ ≤ 2iσ−2
for σ2 ≥ 2, from which it follows from a telescoping sum
that trace-distance between any pair of encrypted Fock
states is at most 2n−1nσ−2. Next, we upper bound the
trace norm of O. To see this, note that the Gersgorin cir-
cle theorem implies that ‖O‖1 is at most the sum of the
absolute values of all its matrix elements. By applying a
summation of Eq. (17) over the indices a and k and by
doing the summation in a first, we can use simple bino-
mial identities to find that ‖O‖1 ≤ 8(n+1)σ−2. Together,
with the triangle inequality on the trace norm of D+O,
this allows us to show that the trace-distance between
arbitrary encrypted states with at most n photons is at
most,
2n−1n+ 4(n+ 1)
σ2
, (19)
which asymptotes to zero for large maximum coherent
amplitudes in the encoding operations.
Adaptive linear optics — Thus far, we have exclu-
sively considered passive linear optics, where there is
no measurement or feedforward. However, feedforward
– the ability to measure a subset of the optical modes,
and use the measurement outcome to dynamically con-
trol the subsequent linear optics network – is an essen-
tial ingredient in many linear optics quantum informa-
tion processing protocols. For example, when employing
single-photon encodings for qubits, it is well known that
universal quantum computing is possible with the addi-
tion of fast-feedforward [15], which is known to be re-
quire non-linearity [16]. On the other hand, it is strongly
believed that without non-linearity such as feedforward,
such schemes cannot be made universal [16].
Can we accommodate for fast-feedforward in the
displacement-key homomorphic encryption protocol? Yes
we can. Without loss of generality, let us imagine that
we wish to measure just one mode and feedforward the
measurement outcome to a subsequent round of linear
optics, to be once again executed by Bob. For server Bob
to perform this measurement, he would have to know the
appropriate decryption operator for that mode. However,
he does not have this by virtue of the protocol, and Alice
cannot provide it to him, lest he misuses it to compromise
security.
The only avenue to accommodating the feedforward is
to make the protocol interactive. That is, whenever Bob
5requires a measurement result, to proceed with the com-
putation he outsources the measurement of that mode
back to Alice, who returns to him a classical result. This
doesn’t undermine the viability of the protocol, since Al-
ice is already assumed to have the ability to apply de-
coding operations, which are by definition separable and
can therefore be performed on a per-mode basis.
It is clear that any computation requiring feedforward
will necessarily require turning the encryption protocol
into an interactive one between Alice and Bob. While this
is undesirable, it is to be expected given that no-go proofs
have been provided against universal, non-interactive,
fully homomorphic protocols [9, 17, 18].
Conclusion — We have presented a technique for ho-
momorphic encryption of almost arbitrary optical states
under the evolution of linear optics. The scheme requires
only separable displacement operations for encoding and
decoding, yet provides perfect secrecy in the limit of large
displacement amplitudes. For passive linear optics, the
protocol requires no client/server interaction, remaining
entirely passive. For adaptive linear optics, an interactive
protocol is required. The technology for implementing
the encoding scheme is readily available today, making
near-term demonstration of elementary encrypted opti-
cal quantum computation viable.
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Preliminaries
Hermite polynomials
Define the Hermite polynomials as
Hn(x) = (−1)nex2 d
n
dxn
e−x
2
, (20)
6and the corresponding Hermite functions as
ψn(x) = e
−x2/2 1√
2nn!
√
pi
Hn(x). (21)
The action of a displacement operator on a position eigenstate
The displacement operator can be written as
D(α) = exp(αaˆ† − α∗aˆ), (22)
where α = u + iv is a complex number, with u, v ∈ R. Now the position and momentum operators which admit
representations as x and 1i
d
dx respectively can also be written as dimensionless quadratures X1 and X2 respectively
which can be related to the ladder operators via the equalities
a =
1√
2
(Xˆ2 − iXˆ1), a† = 1√
2
(Xˆ2 + iXˆ1), (23)
which implies that Xˆ1 =
1√
2
(aˆ† − aˆ) and Xˆ2 = 1i√2
(
aˆ† − aˆ) respectively. Then
[Xˆ1, Xˆ2] =
1
2i
[aˆ† + aˆ, aˆ† − aˆ]
=
1
2i
(
[aˆ†, aˆ† − aˆ] + [aˆ, aˆ† − aˆ])
=
1
2i
(
[aˆ†,−aˆ] + [aˆ, aˆ†])
=
−1
i
[aˆ†, aˆ]
= i. (24)
Since [Xˆ1, Xˆ2] = i the dimensionless quadrature operators Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 indeed satisfy the canonical commutation
relations. We then write the displacement operator in terms of the quadrature operators to get
D(α) = exp(α(
1√
2
Xˆ1 − i√
2
Xˆ2)− α∗( 1√
2
Xˆ1 +
i√
2
Xˆ2))
= exp((α− α∗)Xˆ1/
√
2 + iXˆ2(−α− α∗)/
√
2)
= exp(
√
2ivXˆ1 − iXˆ2
√
2u)
= exp(i(
√
2vXˆ1 −
√
2uXˆ2)). (25)
Now recall that the BCH formula for operators A,B whose commutator is proportional to the identity operator is
ei(A+B) = eiAeiBe−
i2
2 [A,B] = eiAeiBe[A,B]/2. Hence
D(α) = ei
√
2vXˆ1e−i
√
2uXˆ2e[
√
2vXˆ1,−
√
2uXˆ2]/2
= ei
√
2vXˆ1e−i
√
2uXˆ2e−uv[Xˆ1,Xˆ2]
= ei
√
2vXˆ1e−i
√
2uXˆ2e−iuv. (26)
Now let |x〉1 denote an eigenstate of the quadrature operator Xˆ1 with eigenvalue x, so that Xˆ1|x〉1 = x|x〉1. Then it
is clear that eiθX1 |x〉1 = eiθx|x〉1. The position eigenstate can be written in the momentum basis, which is also its
Fourier basis, so
|x〉1 = 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dpe−ipx|p〉2, (27)
7where |p〉2 denotes an eigenstate of the second quadrature operator Xˆ2 with eigenvalues p. Hence
eiθXˆ2 |x〉1 = 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dpe−ipxeiθXˆ2 |p〉2
=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dpe−ipxeiθp|p〉2
=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dpe−ip(x−θ)|p〉2
= |x− θ〉1. (28)
Hence it follows that
D(u+ iv)|x〉1 = ei
√
2vXˆ1e−i
√
2uXˆ2e−iuv|x〉1
= ei
√
2vXˆ1e−iuv|x+
√
2u〉1
= ei
√
2v(x+u)e−iuv|x+
√
2u〉1
= ei
√
2vxei(
√
2−1)uv|x+
√
2u〉1. (29)
Representation of the encrypted state
Lemma 1. Let |ψ〉 = ∑ni=0 λi|i〉 for any λi ∈ C such that 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1. Let E be the encryption operation that randomly
displaces with a complex number u+ iv, where u and v are chosen independently from normal distributions with mean
0 and standard deviation σ. Let ρenc = E(|ψ〉〈ψ|). Then
ρˆenc =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
j
1
2
√
piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
du e−
u2
4σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
∫ ∞
−∞
dy e−σ
2(x−y)2ψi(x)ψj(y)|x+ u〉〈y + u|. (30)
Proof. Note the Fock states can be written in the position basis, so that for all non-negative integers i we have
|i〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx ψi(x)|x〉1. (31)
Then |ψ〉〈ψ| = ∑ni=0∑nj=0 λiλ∗j |i〉〈j|. Expanding this out in the position basis, and dropping the labels on the first
quadrature eigenstates, we get
|ψ〉〈ψ| =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
j
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx2 ψi(x1)ψj(x2)|x1〉〈x2|. (32)
Then for real u and v, we get
D(u+ iv)|ψ〉〈ψ|D(u+ iv)† =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
j
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx2 e
i
√
2v(x1−x2)ψi(x1)ψj(x2)|x1 +
√
2u〉〈x2 +
√
2u|. (33)
Encrypting the state |ψ〉〈ψ| and changing the variable with respect to u then gives
ρˆenc =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
j
1
2piσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
du dv e−
u2+v2
2σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx2 e
i
√
2v(x1−x2)ψi(x1)ψj(x2)|x1 +
√
2u〉〈x2 +
√
2u|
=
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
j
1
4piσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
du dv e−
u2+v2
4σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx2 e
iv(x1−x2)ψi(x1)ψj(x2)|x1 + u〉〈x2 + u|. (34)
We can perform the integral with respect to v to arrive at
ρˆenc =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
j
1
4piσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
du e−
u2
4σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx2 2
√
piσe−σ
2(x1−x2)2ψi(x1)ψj(x2)|x1 + u〉〈x2 + u|. (35)
Simplifying the above and relabeling the variables in the integration then gives the result.
8Integrals of products of Hermite polynomials
The following lemma gives a bound for the exponential suppression of a certain integral of products of Hermite
polynomials in the orders of the some of the Hermite polynomials. The key tools used here are generating functions for
the Hermite polynomials, and this leads to a significant improvement of bounding the absolute value of the integral
of product of Hermite functions over that in Ref. [19].
Now let us define the integral
Ia,b,i,j =
1
2
√
piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
du e−
u2
4σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
∫ ∞
−∞
dy e−σ
2(x−y)2ψi(x)ψj(y)ψa(x+ u)ψb(y + u), (36)
so that
〈a|ρˆenc|b〉 =
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
λiλ
∗
jIa,b,i,j . (37)
If we encrypt another state of the form
∑n
i=0 µi|i〉, then the difference between the two matrix elements will be
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
jIa,b,i,j − µiµ∗jIa,b,i,j
)
=
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
j − µiµ∗j
)
Ia,b,i,j . (38)
Define ρˆi = E(|i〉〈i|), and define ρˆi,j = E(|i〉〈j|). Then
〈a|ρˆi,j |b〉 = Ia,b,i,j . (39)
Clearly for ρ =
∑
i,j λiλ
∗
j |i〉〈j|, by linearity of the encryption operation,
ρˆ = E(ρ) =
∑
i,j
λiλ
∗
j ρˆi,j . (40)
We use the method of generating functions to evaluate the exact form for the integral Ia,b,i,j .
Lemma 2. Let a, b, i, j be non-negative integers and σ > 0. Let σ > 0. Let x = 2σ
2
1+2σ2 and y = 1/(2σ
2) . Then
〈a|ρˆi,j |b〉 = Ia,b,i,j = 1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
yi2+i3
√(
a
i2
)(
b
i3
)(
i
i2
)(
j
i3
)√
xa+b+i+j . (41)
Proof. Let I = Ia,b,i,j . The generating function of the Hermite polynomial is given by
exp(−x2/2 + 2xt− t2) =
∞∑
n=0
e−x
2/2Hn(x)t
n/n!. (42)
Hence, using the notation [tn]f(t) to denote the coefficient of tn in a polynomial f(t), we get
Hn(x) = [t
n] exp(−x2/2 + 2xt− t2)ex2/2n!. (43)
Recall that
ψn(x) = e
−x2/2 1√
2nn!
√
pi
Hn(x). (44)
Now
ψi(x)ψj(y)ψa(x+ u)ψb(y + u)
=e−(x
2+y2)/2e−((x+u)
2+(y+u)2)/2Hi(x)Hj(y)Ha(x+ u)Hb(y + u)
pi
√
2i+j+a+bi!j!a!b!
=[sitjfagb]
√
i!j!a!b!
pi
√
2i+j+a+b
e−x
2/2+2xs−s2e−y
2/2+2yt−t2e−(x+u)
2/2+2(x+u)f−f2e−(y+u)
2/2+2(y+u)g−g2 . (45)
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I = [sitjfagb]
√
i!j!a!b!
pi
√
2i+j+a+b
1
2
√
piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
du
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
∫ ∞
−∞
dy e−
u2
4σ2 e−σ
2(x−y)2e−x
2/2+2xs−s2e−y
2/2+2yt−t2
× e−(x+u)2/2+2(x+u)f−f2e−(y+u)2/2+2(y+u)g−g2 . (46)
This integral can be easily performed. We make use of the identity∫ ∞
−∞
dy e−ay
2−by =
√
pi
a
e
b2
4a , (47)
where a > 0. Using this identity repeatedly, we can show that
I =
√
i!j!a!b!√
2i+j+a+b
αF (48)
where α = 1/(1 + 2σ2) and
F = [sitjfagb] exp
[
α
(
4fgσ2 + 2fs+ 2gt+ 4stσ2
)]
. (49)
By writing the exponential in F as a product of four exponentials, and using the Taylor series expansion for each, we
have
F = [sitjfagb]eα4fgσ
2
eα2fseα2gteα4stσ
2
= [sitjfagb]
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
(α4fgσ2)i1
i1!
(α2fs)i2
i2!
(α2gt)i3
i3!
(α4stσ2)i4
i4!
. (50)
By extracting the coefficients, we get
F =
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
(α4σ2)i1
i1!
(α2)i2
i2!
(α2)i3
i3!
(α4σ2)i4
i4!
=
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
(2σ2)i1
i1!
(1)i2
i2!
(1)i3
i3!
(2σ2)i4
i4!
(2α)i1+i2+i3+i4
=
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
(2σ2)i1+i4
i1!i2!i3!i4!
(2α)i1+i2+i3+i4 . (51)
Clearly, i1 + i2 + i3 + i4 =
a+b+i+j
2 . Thus
F =
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
(2σ2)i1+i4
i1!i2!i3!i4!
√
(2α)a+b+i+j =
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
(2σ2)i1+i4
i1!i2!i3!i4!
√
2a+b+i+j
√
1
(1 + 2σ2)a+b+i+j
(52)
for α = 1/(1 + 2σ2). Note that
F =
∑
i1,i2,i3,i4≥0
i1+i2=a
i1+i3=b
i2+i4=i
i3+i4=j
(2σ2)−i2−i3
√
2a+b+i+j
i1!i2!i3!i4!
√(
2σ2
1 + 2σ2
)a+b+i+j
. (53)
10
Now note that i1 = a− i2, i1 = b− i3, i4 = i− i2 and i4 = j − i3, which implies that
i1!i2!i3!i4! =
√
(a− i2)!(b− i3)!i2!i2!i3!i3!(i− i2)!(j − i3)!. (54)
Therefore
√
a!b!i!j!
i1!i2!i3!i4!
=
√
a!b!i!j!
(a− i2)!(b− i3)!i2!i2!i3!i3!(i− i2)!(j − i3)!
=
√(
a
i2
)(
b
i3
)(
i
i2
)(
j
i3
)
. (55)
Making appropriate substitutions then completes the proof.
Towards the proof of the indistinguishability bound
The key result that we rely on is the result from Lemma 2 which gives an exact form for Ia,b,i,j in terms of
y = 1/(2σ2) and x = 2σ
2
1+2σ2 . Now let b = a + k for k ≥ 0. Then observe that Ia,b,i,j = 0 unless j = i + k. Hence we
restrict our attention to this case. Then we have
Ia,a+k,i,i+k =
1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,min(a,i)
√(
a
i2
)(
a+ k
i2 + k
)(
i
i2
)(
i+ k
i2 + k
)
y2i2+kxa+i+k. (56)
To see this, Lemma 2. Recall that the subscripts for the summation in Eq (41) must satisfy the equalities
i1 + i2 = a (57)
i1 + i3 = b (58)
i2 + i4 = i (59)
i3 + i4 = j. (60)
We can then get
(58)− (57) : b− a = i3 − i2 (61)
(60)− (59) : j − i = i3 − i2. (62)
Hence b − a = j − i. So if b = a + k, then (a + k) − a = j − i which implies that k = j − i and hence j = i + k.
Hence whenever j 6= i + k, there will be nothing in the summation of (41) to sum over, and the summation in that
case evaluates to zero.
Before we proceed, we provide the proofs of several simple but useful technical lemmas. The first technical lemma
we need is the following combinatorial identity.
Lemma 3. Let 0 < x < 1, and let k be a non-negative integer. Then
∑
a≥k x
a
(
a
k
)
= x
k
(1−x)k+1 .
Proof. First note that by relabeling the index for the summation, the sum in the lemma is equal to 1k!
∑
a≥0 x
a+k(a+
k) . . . (a+1) = x
k
k!
dk
dxk
∑
a≥0 x
a+k. By use the generating function 1/(1−x) which holds because |x| < 0, the summation
becomes x
k
k!
dk
dxk
xk
1−x . Simplifying this using the fact that 1− xk = (1− x)(1 + · · ·+ xk+1) yields the result.
The next technical lemma we need also involves binomial coefficients.
Lemma 4. Let x = (2σ2)/(1 + 2σ2), and let i and k be non-negative integers such that 0 ≤ k ≤ i − 1. Then(
i+1
k
)
x− (ik) = (ik) ( kxi−k+1 − 12σ2+1) .
Proof. Note that
(
i+1
k
)
x−(ik) = kxi−k+1− 12σ2+1 is equal to (ik) ( (i+1)xi−k+1 − 1). Next it is easy to see that i+1i−k+1 = 1+ ki−k+1 .
Hence (
i+ 1
k
)
x−
(
i
k
)
=
(
i
k
)(
x+ x
k
i− k + 1 − 1
)
=
(
i
k
)( −1
2σ2 + 1
+
kx
i− k + 1
)
which proves the result.
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Note the trivial fact that
∑
k≥0 x
k = 1 + 2σ2. Let us consider the case of k = 0 first, which corresponds to i = j.
Hence we consider the non-zero matrix elements of ρˆi, which are 〈a|ρˆi|a〉 for a = 0, 1, . . . ,. Notice then that we have
〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = Ia,a,i,i
=
1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,min(a,i)
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2xa+i. (63)
We are then in a position to bound the trace distance between ρˆi+1 and ρˆi for every integer i. In the lemma that
follows, we only consider positive integer i, because the case of i = 0 has already been shown earlier.
Lemma 5. Let i and a be any non-negative integer. Let x = (2σ2)/(1 + 2σ2) and y = 1/(2σ2) for σ > 0. Then
〈a|ρˆi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = −〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
xa+i+1
1 + 2σ2
∑
k=1,...,min{a,i}
(
a
k
)(
i
k − 1
)
y2k. (64)
Proof. To prove this, we consider two scenarios. In one scenario, a is small in the sense that a ≤ i. In the other
scenario, a > i.
When a ≤ i, using Lemma 4, we have the following
〈a|ρˆi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = 1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,a
(
a
i2
)(
i+ 1
i2
)
y2i2xa+i+1 − 1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,a
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2xa+i
=
1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,a
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2xa+i
(
i2x
i− i2 + 1 −
1
2σ2 + 1
)
.
Using the expansion for 〈a|ρˆi|a〉, we then get
〈a|ρˆi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = −〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
1
1 + 2σ2
xa+i
∑
i2=1,...,a
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2 − 1
)
y2i2x. (65)
Now we proceed to consider the case when a > i. Then we can use Lemma 4 again to get
〈a|ρˆi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = 1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,i+1
(
a
i2
)(
i+ 1
i2
)
y2i2xa+i+1 − 1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,i
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2xa+i
=
1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,i
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2xa+i
(
i2x
i− i2 + 1 −
1
2σ2 + 1
)
+
1
1 + 2σ2
(
a
i+ 1
)
y2i+2xa+i+1.
Hence we get
〈a|ρˆi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = −〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
1
1 + 2σ2
xa+i+1
∑
i2=1,...,i
(
a
i2
)(
i
i2 − 1
)
y2i2 +
(
a
i+ 1
)
y2i+2xa+i+1
=
−〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
1
1 + 2σ2
xa+i+1y2
∑
i2=0,...,i
(
a
i2 + 1
)(
i
i2
)
y2i2 , (66)
and the result follows from (65) and (66).
The trace distance between ρˆi+1 and ρˆi is suppressed with increasing σ, as we shall now show.
Lemma 6. The trace distance between ρˆi+1 and ρˆi is
1
2‖ρˆi+1 − ρˆi‖1 ≤ 12σ2 (1 + 1/(2σ2))i. For σ2 ≥ 1/2 we have the
simpler bound 12‖ρˆi+1 − ρˆi‖1 ≤ 2iσ−2/2.
Proof. Since ρˆi+1 and ρˆi are diagonal matrices in the number basis, we have
‖ρˆi+1 − ρˆi‖1 =
∑
a≥0
|〈a|ρi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉| . (67)
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Using Lemma 5 for the exact form of 〈a|ρi+1|a〉 − 〈a|ρˆi|a〉, we get
‖ρˆi+1 − ρˆi‖1 ≤
∑
a≥0
〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
∑
a≥0
xa+i+1
1 + 2σ2
∑
k=1,...,min{a,i}
(
a
k
)(
i
k − 1
)
y2k
≤
∑
a≥0
〈a|ρˆi|a〉
2σ2 + 1
+
∑
a≥0
xa+i+1
1 + 2σ2
∞∑
k=1
(
a
k
)(
i
k − 1
)
y2k, (68)
where
(
a
k
)
= 0 for all k > a. The first summation above is trivial to bound because the trace of a density matrix must
be one, so one must have
∑
a≥0〈a|ρˆi|a〉 = 1. For the second summation, we can use Lemma 3 to get
‖ρˆi+1 − ρˆi‖1 ≤ 1
2σ2 + 1
+
xi+1
1 + 2σ2
∞∑
k=1
xk
(1− x)k+1
(
i
k − 1
)
y2k. (69)
Since x/(1− x) = 2σ2 = y−1 and 1/(1− x) = 2σ2 + 1 for x = (2σ2)/(1 + 2σ2), we get
‖ρˆi+1 − ρˆi‖1 ≤ 1
2σ2 + 1
+ xi+1
i+1∑
k=1
(
i
k − 1
)
yk. (70)
Now
∑i+1
k=1
(
i
k−1
)
yk = y
∑i
k=0
(
i
k
)
yk = y(1 + y)i. Thus using the fact that x ≤ 1, 12σ2+1 ≤ 12σ2 and y = 1/(2σ2), we
get the result.
Clearly then by the telescoping sum, the trace distance between any pair of encrypted diagonal states can be easily
bounded.
Lemma 7. Let n be any positive integer, and let i and j be non-negative integers such that i < j ≤ n. Then the trace
distance between ρˆi and ρˆj is at most
1
2‖ρˆi − ρˆj‖1 ≤ n2σ2 (1 + 1/(2σ2))n. For σ2 ≥ 1/2 we have the simpler bound
1
2‖ρˆi − ρˆj‖1 ≤ 2nnσ−2/2.
Proof. One just needs to write (ρˆi− ρˆi+1) + · · ·+ (ρˆj−1− ρˆj). There are at most n such bracketed terms, so using the
triangle inequality with Lemma 6 gives the result.
We now proceed to obtain a bound on the off-diagonal matrix elements ρi,j . Without loss of generality, assume that
j = i+ k for k ≥ 0. To analyze this case, we first consider the following technical lemma that is easy to verify.
Lemma 8. Let a, i, i2 and k be non-negative integers, and let i2 ≤ a, i. Then(
a
i2
)(
i
i2
)
≤
(
a+ k
i2 + k
)(
i+ k
i2 + k
)
. (71)
Proof. It is easy to see that
(
a
k
)(
i
k
)
=
(
a+k
k
)(
i+k
k
) (i2+kk )2
(a+kk )(
i+k
k )
. Next observe that since i2 ≤ a and i2 ≤ i, we have
(i2+kk )
2
(a+kk )(
i+k
k )
≤ 1.
Using Lemma 8 we can arrive derive bounds for the off-diagonal matrix elements ρˆi,j .
Lemma 9. Let i, k be non-negative integers and let j = i+ k. Let σ2 ≥ 1/2. Then
∑
a≥0
|〈a|ρˆi,j |a+ k〉| ≤
(
1 + 2σ2
4σ4
)k
. (72)
For 2σ2 ≥ 1 we get the simpler bound ∑a≥0 |〈a|ρˆi,j |a+ k〉| ≤ σ−2k.
Proof. Using the exact form for the matrix element 〈a|ρˆi,j |a + k〉 as given in Lemma 2 and Lemma 8 to bound the
binomial coefficients therein, we get
|〈a|ρˆi,j |a+ k〉| ≤ 1
1 + 2σ2
∑
i2=0,...,min(a,i)
(
a+ k
i2 + k
)(
i+ k
i2 + k
)
y2i2+kxa+i+k, (73)
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where y = 1/(2σ2) and x = (2σ2)/(1 + 2σ2). Using Lemma 2 again, we get
|〈a|ρˆi,j |a+ k〉| ≤ (y/x)k〈a+ k|ρˆi+k|a+ k〉. (74)
Using the fact that ρˆi+k has unit trace, we easily get
∑
a≥0 |〈a|ρˆi,j |a+ k〉| ≤ (y/x)k =
(
1+2σ2
4σ4
)k
.
We are now ready to prove the main result.
Theorem 10. Let ρ and ρ′ be any two density supported on the number states |0〉, . . . , |n〉 for some positive integer
n. Let σ2 ≥ 2. Then
‖E(ρ)− E(ρ′)‖1 ≤ 2
nn+ 8(n+ 1)
σ2
. (75)
Proof. Without loss of generality, let ρ and ρ′ be pure states. Consider the matrix
T = E(ρ)− E(ρ′) =
∑
a,b≥0
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
j − µiµ∗j
)
Ia,b,i,j |a〉〈b|. (76)
Now let D be the diagonal component of T and O be the off-diagonal component of T . By the triangle inequality, we
will have ‖T‖1 = ‖D+O‖1 ≤ ‖D‖1 + ‖O‖1. We now proceed to bound the diagonal component. Using Lemma 7, the
diagonal component has a trace norm that is at most 2nnσ−2.
For the off-diagonal elements we can use the Gersgorin Circle Theorem (GCT). First, note that for any i and j,
|λiλ∗j − µiµ∗j | ≤ 2. From the GCT the 1-norm of O is just the sum of the absolute values of all of its matrix elements.
Notice that
O =
∑
a≥0,k≥1
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
j − µiµ∗j
)
Ia,a+k,i,j |a〉〈a+ k|+
∑
a≥0,k≥1
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
j − µiµ∗j
)
Ia+k,a,i,j |a+ k〉〈a| (77)
Hence we obtain from the GCT that
‖O‖1 ≤
∑
a≥0,k≥1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
j − µiµ∗j
)
Ia,a+k,i,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∑
a≥0,k≥1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(
λiλ
∗
j − µiµ∗j
)
Ia+k,a,i,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∑
a≥0,k≥1
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=0
(|Ia,a+k,i,j |+ |Ia+k,a,i,j |) , (78)
where we have used the triangle inequality in the second inequality above. Using the fact that Ia,a+k,i,j is only non-zero
when j − i = k, and similarly for Ia+k,a,i,j , we get
‖O‖1 ≤ 2
∑
a≥0,k≥1
n∑
i=0
(|Ia,a+k,i,i+k|+ |Ia+k,a,i+k,i|) . (79)
Combining this with the fact that Ia,a+k,i,i+k = I
∗
a+k,a,i+k,i we get
‖O‖1 ≤ 4
∑
a≥0,k≥1
n∑
i=0
|Ia,a+k,i,i+k| . (80)
Using Lemma 9 with σ2 ≥ 0 for the geometric sum, this becomes ‖O‖1 ≤ 4
∑n
i=0
∑
k≥1 σ
−2k ≤ 4(n+1)σ−21−σ−2 ≤ 8(n +
1)σ−2. The result then follows.
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